Part IV.
Part A. Introduction to Wolin’s “Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism. ” (Princeton University Press. 8/29/17. Kindle edition.)
- R. Suskind writing in the New York Times. US as Empire. “Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush”. By Ron Suskind, Oct. 17, 2004. New York Times.
“… In the summer of 2002, after I had written an article in Esquire that the White House didn’t like about Bush’s former communications director, Karen Hughes, I had a meeting with a senior adviser to Bush. He expressed the White House’s displeasure, and then he told me something that at the time I didn’t fully comprehend — but which I now believe gets to the very heart of the Bush presidency.
The aide said that guys like me were “in what we call the reality-based community,” which he defined as people who “believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.” I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. “That’s not the way the world really works anymore,” he continued. “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality — judiciously, as you will — we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.” (https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/faith-certainty-and-the-presidency-of-george-w-bush.html) [Emphasis added.]
The quote was later attributed to Karl Rove: Karl Rove’s Prophecy: “We’re an Empire Now, and When We Act, We Create our Own Reality”. By Karel van Wolferen. Global Research, February 05, 2017.(https://www.globalresearch.ca/karl-roves-prophecy-were-an-empire-now-and-when-we-act-we-create-our-own-reality/5572533)
“The curious case of a supposed Karl Rove quote used on The National’s new album ‘Sleep well beast’ “. By Zach Schonfeld, on 9/8/17. “The quote has had quite an extraordinary life since 2004,” Suskind tells me. “We understood it in a particular way in that time. I think we understand more deeply some of the innovations of those in power in that period in terms of separating public dialogue from agreed-upon, discernible reality. Now the loosing of those moorings has grown.”
“The quote makes Bush-era White House staffers uncomfortable because ‘they were all talking in this fashion at that time,’ Suskind says. ‘But they were very, very ardent about no one understanding the playbook they were using. Which is why the quote lives so powerfully in revealing what was happening in that era as well as revealing many of the demons that were loosed in that time, [which] really are inhabiting our nightmares in this time.’ ” (https://www.newsweek.com/national-sleep-well-beast-karl-rove-662307 ) [Emphasis added.]
2. “Runaway Capitalism” by C. Meyer and J. Kirby. Harvard Business Review. January–February 2012 Issue. (https://hbr.org/2012/01/runaway-capitalism)
“Capitalism, as it is practiced in rich countries, has taken two brilliant ideas too far. The first is return on equity (ROE), one way of measuring value creation that has managed to eclipse many other, and broader, ones. The second is competition, which has come to be seen as an end in itself rather than as a tool for promoting growth and innovation.
Both ideas began as effective solutions to a pressing problem—how to allocate resources to produce, as Jeremy Bentham would have it, “the greatest good for the greatest number.” Centuries on, the advanced economies cling tightly to these approaches, but the problem has changed. The mismatch has caused difficulties of such urgency that many people are now declaring capitalism a failure. The whole system has been indicted, not only because of the financial crisis but particularly since that event, as inherently unworkable.
It isn’t true. Capitalism—broadly, private ownership and resources allocated by markets—remains the most powerful, flexible, and robust system for driving society’s prosperity and enhancing quality of life. But keeping it on track will depend on our ability to rethink the priorities that guide everyone in the system, from entrepreneurs to regulators to investors. Together the practitioners of capitalism will need to throttle back the headlong pursuits of ROE and competition, and that process begins with recognizing those ideas for what they are. They are runaways.” [Emphasis added.]
Part B. Introduction to Wolin’s Democracy Inc.
- Social norms. Reference points and comparison.
A basic logical point: we cannot talk about an act or set of conditions as excessive or extreme without another reference point, or points. These points might be only conceptual, or they might refer to more concrete historical conditions. But the claim of extremism implies a relation or comparison.
But there is an immediate problem, potentially, in discussing this comparison between, say, a more moderate reference point and its extreme counterpart: the idea of a social norm. Posing an argument about extremes is highly problematic if one accepts the extreme features as norms, part of normalcy – viewed, despite reservations perhaps, as acceptable. There is no comparison. The issues treated here rely heavily on these distinctions.
The HBR “runaways” example: part of the basic logical structure of their paper is that ROE and competition are subject to some limits. They fully accept practices of capitalism. Yet they reject ideas of extremism (runaways) as framed in their discussion. If however one takes unlimited profit or competition as an acceptable norm in business, as a fundamental and universally valid principle, then clearly their argument is excluded.
NYT/Susskind example: the US is defined as an empire, and the highest elites “make reality” for us, define what reality will be. The US will be managed from this power relation. Since they “create reality” for the people, this is the imposed or even dictated norm – the effective power relation, not rhetoric for the masses.
With some freedom of expression we can discuss this in terms of extremes; frame an argument based on comparing this dictatorial position (or extreme “norm”) against a more moderate view (of exercising power in a democracy). Presenting Wolin’s material will follow this pattern. A sense of perspective is required to understand his terms and argument, a comparison of extremes against alternative positions. But as with the HBR article, if the extreme is taken as an acceptable norm – in politics, economics, or some hybrid of these – then Wolin’s argument, like theirs, has no real starting point.
Introducing Wolin’s material this way, by mentioning the problem of extremes against another point of reference, is required because alternatives in the US have been effectively marginalized – along with the voices representing them. Wolin offers this as a form of economic orthodoxy made political.* This obviously does not exclude criticism. But even as moderate, their ideas are not generally effective – are not politically significant. Wolin employs a different vocabulary than Harvey**, but relates nonetheless an (extreme) neoliberal control system. Yet understanding the extremity in effect requires serious attention to alternatives, and to recent history. Passive acceptance of dominant ideology and present conditions – taking these as an acceptable norm – will exclude Wolin’s useful points on principle. Clearly his points too should be viewed critically. Yet behind the strong criticism Wolin offers is the reference to a vanishing idea of moderation (and alternatives) in the US political system; thus rejecting the idea that recent historical events and ongoing conditions (Cold War, 9/11/2001) somehow required the emergence of the US as an empire, as the commercially dominated “Democracy Incorporated”.
*S. Wolin, Preface to the paperback edition.
** C. Hedges, Introduction to the 2017 Edition of Democracy Inc.
Emergence is a key idea in Wolin’s material. The text is strongly narrative, combined with ongoing analysis. The perspective developed is from political theory. To clarify this perspective, the following is excerpt is given.
2. Political theory. A basic discussion framework.
“Political theory. Critical, systematic reflection about power in its public and private forms, particularly about the claims of government to possess legitimacy and authority; and, more generally, such reflection about the place of politics in social life. […] Its ambitions are to explain the political realm, to explore what is at stake in political practice, and to elucidate the values which motivate political action or which are affected by it.
One approach to the fulfilment of these ambitions is conceptual inquiry, aiming to elucidate the meaning and value‐content of ideals by which political actors are guided, like liberty, equality, and fraternity, or terms of political debate and analysis like power and authority.” […]
(By Andrew Reeve. From: political theory in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. (www.oxfordreference.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2013. All Rights Reserved. Accessed 10/25/18.)
In continuing a short-form view of neoliberal systems, focusing here on the US, limited political theory material from Wolin adds characteristic features to those given previously. These characteristic features are key terms of his text: “Democracy Incorporated”, “inverted totalitarianism”, “managed democracy”, and “superpower”. Collectively these outline a significant part of the current US political scene, stressing the period up to 2010.
Before offering excerpts from Wolin’s historical materials and treating these main terms, however, a comment is appropriate on the importance of political theory in this text and in a functioning democracy. The point is only mentioned, but there are many implications. The current US can be described as politically exclusionary, as Wolin says, managed by a detached elite. The idea of a substantive area of public discussion and political influence – meaningful institutional power, not chatter on the sidelines – is highly doubtful.
3. Political theory as academic area, and as an intellectual arena for responsible citizens.
Political theory is not only a specialized academic subject, but an area of higher level review of the US, in a comprehensive sense: socially and philosophically; as a critical set of living themes or ideas, not subordinated to the temporary choices of “modern political management”; or limited to any select group, except in the sense of a willingness to participate as informed citizens. We see a partial measure of our current system in the treatment of such ideas — in their nearly complete marginalization. As Wolin relates this: political power as an elite domain or preserve, not shared as a more egalitarian democratic principle. This is reflected, again, in US institutions as well.
The related division of labor mindset is so pervasive, taken as natural and obviously right, with the result that an act of direct recovery is needed: hence the restatement that political theory is both a specialized academic area and the intellectual center of democratic participation, theory and practice, available to responsible citizens. If the plausibility of this reference point is lost, then the extreme corporate-bureaucratic conquest Wolin describes is complete: “we’ll dictate reality for you” – “we’ll manage the business of the US Empire”. Wolin rejects this idea of a dictatorial elite as a perversion of democratic theory. So we insist again on the reference point versus extreme idea. This provides a needed backdrop – a context for comparison — for offering Wolin’s main terms and the historical description that outlines their plausibility.
4. A sketch of current US political conditions drawn from S. Wolin
The following is a “present state” summary based on Wolin’s ideas. The purpose is to indicate the particular direction of the historical materials selected. It also concludes this introduction to Wolin’s Democracy Inc., his perspective offered as political theory. At the risk of over-stressing the point, this theoretical perspective should be in mind; the views are broad in their way, but clearly not comprehensive.
A “present state” sketch: Whether there is general awareness of this or not, the US has evolved into a form of pseudo-corporation, managed or controlled in the manner this implies. Political goals are dominated by economics, with military power woven into a US dominated, global influence and governmental structure: the US as empire. Power is thus exerted mainly in these two ways. Wolin stresses the rise of corporate power as central to this dynamic. The government and economy are “amalgamated”: Democracy Incorporated [or neoliberal state*]. This does not mean citizen-consumers are not served by this complex system. Yet features of democratic equality are extremely attenuated, as they must be for a strongly hierarchic political-economic control system.
The US management system has achieved great economic and military power, and control over others – including its own citizens. Thus with this achievement, Wolin insists the social and political cost has been great. There is little authentic democracy, only a kind of vestigial theatre; and the power system in place has many (negatively) unique, as he describes them, “totalitarian” features. The author does not view a corporate democracy, showing extreme or totalitarian features, as a legitimate democratic government. This summary of course does not do justice to his argument, but can serve as a rough sketch of his current state view.
*(Christopher Hedges, Introduction to the 2017 edition of Democracy Inc. Hedges directly links Wolin’s terms with neoliberal views.)
5. Key narrative features of the US, from WWII to the present. War, mobilization, and the amalgamation of government and corporations.
The author indicates clearly this present system did not simply appear around 2000, of course, although he has particularly harsh words for the (Bush 2) administration up to 2008. As noted, his analysis is strongly historical and developmental. The 1930’s represent a time of both crisis and a partial flowering of social democracy. Concern for human need and a citizen center were far more pronounced. Yet Wolin sees a dramatic turn with WWII and the ensuing Cold War:
“The Second World War marked a particularly notable moment in the evolution of expanding American power. The Roosevelt administration measured its wartime powers against the challenge posed by a totalitarian system that made no secret of its aim to control as much of the globe as possible.12 The defeat of totalitarianism demanded the creation of a “home front” and “total mobilization.” It was necessary, so the justification ran, “to fight fire with fire.” “Universal” (i.e., male) military conscription was instituted; the economy was controlled by government “planning” directed toward prescribed production goals, prohibited from producing most consumer goods, and subjected to central allocation of vital materials. The labor force, for all practical purposes, was conscripted: its mobility was restricted, wages and prices were fixed, while collective bargaining was put on hold. Food and fuel were rationed, censorship was introduced, and the government undertook to wage a propaganda war, enlisting radio, newspapers, and the movie industry in the single purpose of winning the war. There was an all-enveloping atmosphere of apprehension: uniformed soldiers everywhere, warnings about spies, news censorship, propaganda films, heroic war movies, patriotic music, casualty figures. As a leading constitutional scholar warned shortly after the end of World War II, “The effects of the impact of total war on the Constitution will . . . become embedded in the peacetime Constitution.”13
“Strikingly, in the post-1945 wars, whether hot or cold, warfare became normal, incorporated into ordinary life without transforming it.” [The author notes: “Korea (1951–54), Vietnam (1961–73), the shorter first Gulf War (1991)”.] (Wolin, p. 105-106.)
WWII, the Cold War, and the emergence of “a new collective identity”:
“With the outbreak of World War II, the New Deal was superseded by the forced mobilization and governmental control of the entire economy and the conscription of much of the adult male population. For all practical purposes the war marked the end of the first large-scale effort at establishing the tentative beginnings of social democracy in this country…”
“At the same time that the war halted the momentum of political and social democracy, it enlarged the scale of an increasingly open cohabitation between the corporation and the state. That partnership became ever closer during the era of the Cold War (1947–93). Corporate economic power became the basis of power on which the state relied, as its own ambitions, like those of giant corporations, became more expansive, more global, and, at intervals, more bellicose. Together the state and corporation became the main sponsors and coordinators of the powers represented by science and technology. The result is an unprecedented combination of powers distinguished by their totalizing tendencies, powers that not only challenge established boundaries—political, moral, intellectual, and economic—but whose very nature it is to challenge those boundaries continually, even to challenge the limits of the earth itself. Those powers are also the means of inventing and disseminating a culture that taught consumers to welcome change and private pleasures while accepting political passivity. A major consequence is the construction of a new “collective identity,” imperial rather than republican (in the eighteenth-century sense), less democratic…” [Emphasis added.] (Preface, Democracy Incorporated.)
From the standpoint of US history and political theory, this era marks a turning point. With the appearance of an immense threat and entry into war, there is vast mobilization for a unified cause. Extreme conditions call for a matching or extreme response. Yet the developments of the Cold War that follow, and those leading to the present are the focus here. These must be considered, the author underlines, as a complex social transformation. War might be called hot or cold; but the character of ongoing preparation, readiness, and mobilization point to a continuous war posture.
A substantive description of this immense transformation of the US and its institutions is clearly a very large project itself. Thus the outline of this here is quite limited. The author insists on the changing if not blurring concepts of war and peace. Also, with immense institutional change, centered on the rise of corporate and industrial power, public and private “enterprise” – how these are understood or categorized – becomes an interpretive problem on its own. With blurring definitions of war, of national threat, and meeting its demands – real or imagined – it seems extremity and “normalcy” grow closer and closer. In such circumstances, a balanced perspective is difficult. Despite the scale of the changes in the US Cold War time, however, Wolin raises central questions of political power; insists on alternative ideas of democracy; and questions the legitimacy of the US as an “imperial democracy”.
It is important to note also the idea of the Cold War as “real” war, is not simply Wolin’s view. It is not a figure of speech, but highly programmatic. The character of the response to a war/crisis is itself a moral challenge.
“We are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed object is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. . . . [T]here are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective means than those used against us”.62 [From Dem. Inc.: “Quoted in Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War. p. 34.” The text is from a study requested by Eisenhower.]
[Wolin’s response:] “Thus anticommunism as mimesis: the character of the enemy supplied the norm for the power demands that the democratic defender of the free world chose to impose on itself.” (p. 36-37).
“Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply.” The author makes a critical point: the enormous institutional development, as corporate-industrial-productive (“private enterprise”) intimately linked to the military/government, is hardly a matter of sheer growth and production — of expanding offices and staff. A national ethos (or identity) develops in these conditions. This does not imply this was universally accepted. A justifying ideology accompanies the maximization of productive and military power, and the need for an elite to manage it.* (p 39-40) Thus a central part of Wolin’s narrative concerns the “radical change in the American political identity” (p 38-39) in the Cold War period. There is a notable turn away from social democracy, and toward the new power system:
“That a political figure as bizarre, crude, and unscrupulous as McCarthy could generate the tidal wave of McCarthyism was no doubt due in part to the support he received from reputable politicians, such as Senator Taft, and from influential intellectuals, such as William Buckley, but it was the Cold War itself that lent resonance to his antics and an inward turn to what seemed primarily a matter of foreign and defense policy. Many of the public officials, trade union leaders, intellectuals, and academics who were vilified or purged actually adhered to the social democratic ideals and programs of the New Deal; this suggested that a domestic power struggle was in the making that would redefine American politics for the next half century or more. Put simply: New Deal values of social democracy were effectively purged …”
“The Cold War effected a radical change in the American political identity to accompany the new power imaginary. One of the major themes of Cold War propaganda was that although the American economy far outstripped that of any other nation or combination of nations, Americans would be required to forgo the prospect of substantial and steady improvement in their social, economic, cultural, and political prospects. In confidential discussions public officials pondered how to get “our people” to recognize “that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake.” The effort would require “sacrifice,” “unity,” and “tenacity of purpose.” The meaning of “sacrifice” was cast in the bureaucratic euphemism of “significant domestic financial and economic adjustments.”65 Less opaque, one official estimate was that if a nuclear war broke out, it was possible that ten million Americans might die.66” [Emphasis added.]
“All of the elements aimed at the “mobilization” of society—from proposals for universal military training to the institutionalization of a huge defense economy that represented a business version of a New Deal; from loyalty purges and red scares to government-sponsored propaganda to promote political orthodoxy … spelled the transformation of popular participation, from New Deal experiments in participatory democracy to a populism exchanging socioeconomic power for loyal conformism, hope for fear.” 67 (p 38-39).
*(“The electorate was not infrequently portrayed as inattentive to politics, ill-informed, and indifferent—qualities that some academics considered functionally useful.69 The clear implication was that elitism was the antidote to mass ignorance and essential to victory in the struggle for freedom. Elitism signified a privileged claim to power on the part of those who not only manifested proven intelligence, experience, and sterling character but also, unlike the fantasy-prone masses, were “realists.”70 A whole ideology emerged to legitimate elitism: the “realists” and “neoliberals” such as Niebuhr, George Kennan, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.” (p. 39-40))
<<<<<<<<<< >>>>>>>>>>
6. Mobilization. Introduction.
A few clarifications are in order, as this middle section about the neoliberal state expands. Key ideas, excerpts, and interpretations are drawn from Harvey and Wolin, as material deserving serious consideration for understanding the current US – especially its leading institutions; and then also, implications for secondary types, such as public libraries. In a sense this is a dramatic transition.
Yet at the risk of moving too far ahead in this overview, or risk implying what mobilization might mean for modest institutions like libraries, we raise this idea (again) to avoid losing the basic discussion thread: will public libraries be (fully) mobilized or assimilated to the social processes discussed here; reflect an identity changing absorption – loss of values — within an economically dominated (neoliberal) state – (or from Rove) a US Empire? Interpretive patterns and labels vary; but that a context of overbearing economic pressure exists is hard to overlook. To see this context as neutral is highly questionable.
It is true the particular pattern here, frequently based on ideas from two selected authors, is brief and hardly definitive. Yet we insist (again) such materials are frequently marginalized* — the views do not reflect the great US power centers – and are important as much needed alternatives, and for the strength of their message. Questions concerning the connections or influences between primary US institutions and public libraries are discussed but not settled here. Yet the character of an elite controlled (economic) mobilization or assimilation process – thus without substantive political input or representation – is too serious a topic for libraries and citizens to let the subject be ignored or uncontested.
*(Hedges, Introduction to the 2017 edition of Democracy Inc.)
7. Mobilization in the US. Definitions. Defense Production Acts – excerpts.
Is there ever demobilization? Wolin would say no (p. 38-39). The idea recurs in various forms in his text as a major theme. In part, his main terms — democracy incorporated, managed democracy, inverted totalitarianism, superpower — reflect “mobilizing” the country; the (fixed) institutionalization of certain power objectives and processes. Mobilization reflects the construction and maintenance of the US Empire.
The idea of mobilizing the US, even in this abstract form, is highly suggestive. The social implications are substantial – made clear with the term empire. Yet the present scope, noted again, is limited to an overview. Only key features are given.
To begin: (1) and (2) are background themes, followed by longer definitions.
(1) “Mobilization of the state harnesses the national economy to the military machine in order to conduct war.” [The Oxford Companion to American Military History. Oxford University Press. See full citation below.]
(2) Conduct war … or build a military and economic empire, with one sustaining the other? As political theory: what kind of democratic decision making processes are involved in this vast enterprise?
Mobilization. Social sciences.
“Mobilization. Two general definitions apply: (1) Preparation for war, including calling reserves to active duty, placing armed forces on a state of alert, shifting economies to a war footing, and where necessary, implementing a draft; and (2) The organization of political action on a large scale. The American civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and the international antinuclear movement of the 1970s and 1980s are examples of the latter. Studies of mobilization tend to focus either on human participants or on the resources necessary to their collective action.”
[“mobilization.” Dictionary of the Social Sciences. : Oxford University Press, January 01, 2002. Accessed 1/19/19.]
Mobilization and the military.
“Mobilization. …is the process of assembling and organizing troops, materiel, and equipment for active military service in time of war or national emergency. As such, it brings together the military and civilian sectors of society to harness the total power of the nation. It is the mechanism that facilitates the successful prosecution of any conflict. […]
Although the United States has historically relied on mobilization to meet its wartime needs, with the start of the Cold War it began to maintain higher levels of military forces in peacetime and to deploy them in close proximity to potential enemies. American strategy assumed a short warning time to respond to its major threat, the Soviet Union. The ebb and flow of the Cold War was such that public consensus allowed the military to maintain a large active force in high state of readiness, with sizable stocks of supplies for logistics support. […]
The nation’s commitment to readiness, in great part, was enabled by the Defense Production Act of 1950, which has since been extended or amended over forty times. […]
Mobilization levels depend upon the existence of forward bases, the level of industrial infrastructure, prepositioned equipment, industrial preparedness, preparedness planning, and public and congressional support. Ideally, high levels of any or all of those factors ease the entire process. Naturally, all are influenced by perceived threat. Generally, the higher the level of perceived threat, the higher the corresponding levels of support.” [Emphasis added.]
[Canedy, S. (2000). Mobilization. (Ed.) The Oxford Companion to American Military History. : Oxford University Press. Accessed 1/19/19.]
Defense Production Act of 1950.
“A law passed on September 8, 1950, during the Korean War, to expand production and secure economic stability in the United States. It included provisions on inflation and stabilization, rent control, agricultural prices, defense mobilization, and taxes and appropriations for defense use. It established the Joint Committee on Defense Production to supervise the act’s implementation.”
[“Defense Production Act of 1950.” The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military. : Oxford University Press, January 01, 2002. Accessed 1/19/19.]
Defense Production Act Reauthorization of 2009. Excerpts.
This area with excerpts from the 2009 Act will conclude the narrative section of Wolin’s material. (A brief excerpt immediately below, with a link to the govinfo source – the reader is encouraged to see the full text.) The historical material then leads to his main terms for the present US. Several points are notable in this mobilization section, but one to highlight is that the enormous development of the corporate and military area – the combined nature of this – is in no way a narrow “defense only” effort. The scale extends, as policy, across the economy. Thus the military and defense capacity, the industrial base for this is:
“deeply and directly influenced by” … “the overall competitiveness of the industrial economy”, and “the ability of industries in the United States, in general, to produce internationally competitive products and operate profitably while maintaining adequate research and development to preserve competitiveness with respect to military and civilian production.” [Emphasis added.]
(Defense Production Act Reauthorization of 2009. Excerpts. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-111publ67/html/PLAW-111publ67.htm)
Economic development in general, and a very large number of sectors, are to some degree drawn into a continuous government defense strategy. Rather than addressing one period of crisis, a long-term development program or form of mobilization developed. Broad economic strength and activity are integral to the US defense posture, blurring the lines between what is military and civilian.
An important point then is to look beyond the more obvious functional advantages of combined development. Clearly, a developed industrial sector generally benefits the military. Beyond this, there is an institutional and idea-based ethos developing in a particular heightened form – US power is projected in a multidimensional way, at home and abroad, as corporate and military. There are other historical precedents for this. Uniqueness is not the issue. When done on an immense scale, as is the case for the US, the question of empire building emerges. Wolin stresses this imperial idea, as institutional and as national identity.
At issue here, naturally, is not the discussion of US geopolitical strategy and the economic features that go with this. Yet to understand the present US institutional context, its character and influence from larger to smaller governmental institutions, a consideration of selective but central features would seem necessary.
A number of central features from Wolin’s Democracy Inc. were provided, in preparation for his main, summarizing terms. We began with material from R. Suskind, and with K. Rove’s remarks about “creating reality” and the US Empire. A description from the HBR followed. Current capitalism was noted as having “runaways”: ROE and competition. Both of these excerpts pointed to the problem noted next: criticism of extremes implies comparison with reference points; and there is the related issue of social norms. Perspective is needed, whether historical or conceptual. A discussion of extremes loses its force without a developed tandem structure.
This comparative structure is central to understanding Wolin’s point of view. With this, the insistence on his perspective from political theory. Citizens too have claims to such perspectives. Advancing Wolin’s comparative structure, next, involved features from his WWII to the present narrative. War, mobilization, and the growing “amalgamation” of corporate and government power are dominant aspects; and with America’s imperial ambitions, temporary extremes become continual or normalized; definitions blur. War and mobilization are continual. The two-pronged corporate-military empire develops perpetually. The institutional scale and its related ideas, or ethos, are only suggested here. Some understanding is gained, however, by offering Wolin’s main terms, which have a summary quality for the present US – a single, alternative view, critical of the current system and its extremes. The next section gives an overview of these central terms or ideas.
“…Together the state and corporation became the main sponsors and coordinators of the powers represented by science and technology. The result is an unprecedented combination of powers distinguished by their totalizing tendencies…” (Wolin. Preface, Democracy Inc.)
<<<<<<<<<< >>>>>>>>>>
“Neoliberal democracy. Instead of citizens, it produces consumers. Instead of communities, it produces shopping malls. The net result is an atomized society of disengaged individuals who feel demoralized and socially powerless.
In sum, neoliberalism is the immediate and foremost enemy of genuine participatory democracy, not just in the United States but across the planet, and will be for the foreseeable future.” ― Noam Chomsky
(https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/324599-neoliberal-democracy-instead-of-citizens-it-produces-consumers-instead-of)
<<<<<<<<<< >>>>>>>>>>
(To be continued in part V.)