(Series explanation. An educational model excessively governed by business, science, and technology subjects is inadequate and unbalanced, despite the gloss of “modern progress”. The reduction (or even elimination) of humanistic studies deserves serious attention. The long term effects of such educational policies, carried out by various institutions, will be immense. In view of the scale and power of the forces involved, one has no illusions about any small scale contrary effort. But this does not mean the effort should be neglected.)

(Article No. 1.) Remarks on the 1965 Arts and Humanities Act.                                                                  by Edward Eggleston

The following excerpts are from the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965.¹ More than only establishing this agency, they are clearly broader policy statements. Noteworthy positions are taken on the special role and meaning of the arts and humanities for the American people. With these areas under particular economic pressure, especially in postsecondary education, it seems an appropriate moment to revisit these statements. (From here, “arts and humanities” in the commentary will typically be replaced by just “humanities.”)

… (3) An advanced civilization must not limit its efforts to science and technology alone, but must give full value and support to the other great branches of scholarly and cultural activity in order to achieve a better understanding of the past, a better analysis of the present, and a better view of the future.

(4) Democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citizens. It must therefore foster and support a form of education, and access to the arts and the humanities, designed to make people of all backgrounds and wherever located masters of their technology and not its unthinking servants. …

 (7) The practice of art and the study of the humanities require constant dedication and devotion. While no government can call a great artist or scholar into existence, it is necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government to help create and sustain not only a climate encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry but also the material conditions facilitating the release of this creative talent.

(8) The world leadership which has come to the United States cannot rest solely upon superior power, wealth, and technology, but must be solidly founded upon worldwide respect and admiration for the Nation’s high qualities as a leader in the realm of ideas and of the spirit.

(9) Americans should receive in school, background and preparation in the arts and humanities to enable them to recognize and appreciate the aesthetic dimensions of our lives, the diversity of excellence that comprises our cultural heritage, and artistic and scholarly expression.

(10) It is vital to democracy to honor and preserve its multicultural artistic heritage as well as support new ideas, and therefore it is essential to provide financial assistance to its artists and the organizations that support their work.

(11) To fulfill its educational mission, achieve an orderly continuation of free society, and provide models of excellence to the American people, the Federal Government must transmit the achievement and values of civilization from the past via the present to the future, and make widely available the greatest achievements of art. …          (From the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965.)

In contrast to the broad range and import of these excerpts, this study will focus merely on certain suggested aspects. Discussion refers to large themes like education and the social influence of science and technology, but through considering a very limited number of basic principles. First, however, a restatement of key ideas from the excerpts is given, especially those referring to national purpose and identity.

Congress states that as Americans in the role of democratic world leadership, we must fully support the humanities. An advanced civilization is not based solely on science and technology. This is further described as involving particular attention to two aspects: our multicultural artistic heritage and high scholarly/artistic standards. Federal government support in and beyond education requires providing “models of excellence,” and broad access to “the greatest achievements of art.” Thus the essential role of the humanities, especially works of higher quality, and notable federal support are given as central features of American democracy, our sense of purpose and self understanding.

Further implications of this distinctive American democratic view are given. With the development and acquisition of a more humanities centered education, given greater depth and meaning by models of high achievement, Americans are better prepared to interpret their own lives and society.  As the text states, “Democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citizens.” Thus cultivating these qualities (largely) through humanistic education is required for substantive democratic participation. In addition, a nation composed of such citizens is more deserving of a central international role. World leadership based on “power, wealth, and technology” is insufficient — such a position requires leadership “in the realm of ideas and the spirit.” As the text suggests, national governance and international authority are strongly rooted in our striving for a particular kind of democratic wisdom. Humanistic education and artistic excellence are essential for a more balanced development leading to this end.²

Such aspirations, in particular the sense of American identity based on balanced education pursuing wisdom, imply considerable challenges. Certainly many related avenues of discussion are available. Of these however, the basic contrast posed in the congressional excerpts draws attention: one group emphasizing power, wealth, science, and technology; and a contrasting group under the term humanities.

Despite the generality of these terms, the contrast has considerable interpretive potential.³ One might note this potential as suggesting volumes of analysis. Naturally the scope here is far more limited: specify somewhat the general terms/contrast areas, discuss a central problem implied by the contrast, and affirm the congressional view of the necessity (and thus active support) of the humanities.

1. Two Contrasting Areas, Two “Rationalities”

One approach for specifying and discussing the contrasting congressional text groups involves ideas developed by Paul Ricœur. In particular, his 1985 paper Éthique et politique (Ethics and politics).⁴ By no means tracing his full discussion, we can still draw key ideas and structural aspects for this purpose. The rationale for this is the considerable alignment of philosophical principles. For this discussion, we note clear “contrast group” similarities, especially the related central issue both stress: the tendency of the technology-economics group (key ideas, pursuits) to dominate and disrupt an arguably better role for political philosophy, and for the humanities (considered generally).

With these similarities between the two texts, differences should be noted. Although by definition a political document, the congressional text stresses support and autonomy for the humanities. The Ricœur article, as an extended philosophical discussion, orders and clarifies relations between ethics, politics, and technology-economics. These differences in scale and purpose are noteworthy.

With such differences registered, we turn to specifying the contrasting groups reflected in both documents. An initial step is a shift in terms. (As stated Paul Ricœur’s 1985 Éthique et politique is the central source. With this statement of attribution, unneeded repetitious citations are omitted. Direct quotes are cited. A similar note will mark the end of this citation section.)

Ricœur develops two opposing, basic categories for his discussion. The first is “a technical-economic rationality” (la rationalité techno-économique), the second “a political rationality” or perhaps better, “rational political principles” (rationalité politique). Despite slight changes by context, these terms represent very consistent idea groups or forms of “rationality.” The main terms may be directly aligned with the contrasting congressional text groups: technical-economic rationality and (power), wealth, science, and technology; and rational political principles with humanities.

« Rationalité techno-économique »

Technical-economic rationality ⁵ is described with several key features. The organized struggle against nature (lutte contre nature), the methodical organization of work, and rationalized relations between production, distribution, and consuming are central. The author stresses the abstract character of these features, describing the group as comprising an “abstract social mechanism” (mécanisme social abstrait). This will be contrasted later with the important concept of a concrete “historical community” (communauté historique), the social basis for rational political principles. Among other aspects, Ricœur sees this abstract/universal character as important on the individual and larger social levels. For the individual, the abstract rationality with universal application is key to a modern self-understanding, even a form of instruction in reason as such. The individual sees the transnational application and the characteristic “modernity” of this technical-economic mode of thought. For society, Ricœur emphasizes the role this technical-economic thought pattern contributed to the idea of a modern state. The expansion of the “historical community” by means of the abstract principles of the rational struggle against nature is therefore a defining feature.

« Rationalité politique »

Ricœur thus makes clear that the technical-economic “abstract social mechanism” has a separable conceptual form, a distinct “rationality.” This form is strongly contrasted with the group “rational political principles.” It should be noted that this latter group is extensively developed, with more elements and a more complex structure. For our purposes here, however, a selective feature set is covered.

To begin describing this feature set, and move toward outlining a separable political “rationality,” the historical endpoint is given: the modern (Western) democratic state. Stating this goal provides an organizing principle against which other features, historical/developmental or conceptual, may be measured or understood. This makes clear also that despite aspects of Ricœur’s political principles seeming idealistic, as part of a theoretical discussion, his principles are actually rooted in interpreting essentially current democratic conditions.

With noting the democratic state as unifying idea for the selected rational political principles, a word is offered on the term rational. It is not used in a special or unusual way. As with the democratic state as unifying concept, rational refers to the coherence of these political principles. It is a “fitting together” quality, a sense of internal relatedness of an idea group. This is the general sense of the term intended here. The specific qualities giving this general character result from relating the selected features.

Of the features forming a subset (here) of Ricœur’s rational political principles, two require particular emphasis with the democratic state concept: citizenship and ethical intention. As will follow, Ricœur relates these three in a very pronounced way with historical/developmental and conceptual aspects. The resulting closeness and coherence of his formulation illustrates then their rationality, and distinctive character (among otherwise familiar ideas).

Offered in overview fashion, the following gives (selected) features from Ricœur’s democratic state historical/developmental description: Earlier the idea of historical community was introduced as a concrete entity contrasted with technical-economic thought as an abstract social mechanism. This community is described as a distinct cultural unit, with a shared narrative, norms, and symbolic system. The state is formed from this historical community, its organization for making decisions. The division of emphasis on form or force for state development marks a turning point. In Ricœur’s description, form reflects the development of a nation of laws. In an important sense, the turn from arbitrary force to law reflects a more rational political philosophy. This finds expression in the late 18^th century in the essentially modern democratic state, with constitutions, balance of powers, and independent judiciaries. The process described from historical community to democratic state in this overview pattern thus reflects stages of an integrative state development.

Despite the philosophical/theoretical nature of this overview, the concrete historical community basis is key to Ricœur’s political principles. While the democratic state is a generalized goal, the basis in a particular community, with a shared past, present, and future is important to note. Features listed like norms and narratives suggest but do not capture the social meaning of these antecedent, or pre-state aspects. Once founded, the democratic state also reflects points of achievement. Ricœur stresses the elevation of the democratic citizen, with notable ethical gains. Together these ideas of national individuality and ethical development form (in part) the rationale for continuation of this political process. For the state’s future to be a continuation of this integrative process, a clear autonomy, a separable set of rational political principles are needed as an (ongoing) framework, a discernable foundation.

With this historical/developmental overview, then, a narrative structure is given for relating certain features from Ricœur’s political principles. As previously mentioned, ethics and citizenship are features of particular importance in this democratic state context. Of the three, however, citizenship is the center of Ricœur’s ideas. (« Je définirai volontiers pour ma part la philosophie politique comme une réflexion sur la citoyenneté. »)⁶ 

Though familiar, one notes that the democratic state stresses the theoretical equality, and thus power sharing, entrusted to the citizen. In addition to this familiar (though hard won) idea, Ricœur reminds us that this political form has a powerful ethical intention. Moving the citizen to the center emphasizes their intrinsic value as individuals, both as potential political participants and, just as much, their basic protection as citizens by law.

The development of the nation of laws idea, although serving several purposes, expresses then this ethical intention of founding and maintaining the citizen role. Ricœur places particular stress on this issue. Law provides a larger, rational, state-level framework. Yet the citizen-directed features of this frame express (among other aspects) an appeal to reason on the individual, ethical plane.

This brings us to a point of summary for Ricœur’s rational political principles. Although many features are involved, Ricœur insists on the outlook of the citizen, their view of participating, ideally, in a just democratic system. As described in the historical overview, the democratic state emerged from an integrative process, with important achievements reflected in the nation of laws idea, especially the (ethical) implications for citizens. For this historical process to continue, it was noted that true autonomy is required. Ricœur holds that this process is rightly philosophic and political in nature. This is the central point in his explanation of the rationality, the philosophical integrity, of the political principles and their historical context.

1.    II. The Problem: Two Contrasting Areas/“Rationalities”

Having described the contrasting groups of technical-economic rationality and rational political principles, we return to the previously stated problem both the congressional text and Ricœur suggest: the tendency of the technology-economics group (key ideas, pursuits) to dominate and disrupt an arguably better role for political philosophy, and for the humanities (considered generally).

To illustrate this problem examples from Ricœur and the congressional text are given. The Ricœur examples emphasize politics and society. The congressional text example concerns the humanities. These individual examples relate differing roles (objectives, activities), yet share the problem of disruption related to technical-economic influence.

Politics and Technical-Economic Rationality

The first example concerns Marxism, and is from Éthique et politique. According to Ricœur, in historical examples of Marxist/totalitarian systems, political and individual freedoms are reduced to a vastly subordinate role in relation to economic/productive control. This is largely based, he notes, on a theoretical view equating economic and political liberalism. The ethical and political gains (related earlier) are thus seen as an ideological front or diversion (simple écran hypocrite) for liberal/classical economic practices. From this viewpoint, the Marxist seizing of power (to take over the “means of production”) is paramount. Political/ethical principles have then little conceptual autonomy. In short, Ricœur describes this drastic reduction of political philosophy to overriding economic ideas as a severe mistake.

The second example treats widespread dissatisfaction found in (advanced) industrial society. Ricœur cites and agrees with Eric Weil: « l’individu dans la société moderne, écrit-il, est essentiellement insatisfait ».⁷ Although technical-economic rationality is a defining feature for the modern state and society, hence central to self understanding, the growing importance moves toward excess. The methodical struggle against nature, the primacy given to efficiency, calculation; these ideas tend to assume an excessive social presence or force. Ricœur notes this as a tendency to become the new “sacred” (le nouveau sacré). Against this general description emphasizing forceful economic pressures, of technical-economic rationality, Ricœur offers certain social and individual level reasons for this current sense of malaise.

To begin, he notes that a society defined solely (or largely) in economic terms is essentially defined by struggle, by competition. Access to (abundant) goods (fruits de travail) is limited by this struggle. Social groups/layers thus confront each other without recourse (sans arbitrage). These conditions encourage ideas of injustice and social division. The individual is subject to a social mechanism (la mécanique sociale) promoting isolation and insecurity. Frequently not finding sense in work (based predominantly on technical-economic rationality), the individual looks for meaning beyond this. Work is thus reduced to gaining free time. The consequence the author notes is work that is “technically rational,” but nonsensical/unreasonable in human terms. (« le travail au niveau de la société économique en tant que telle, paraît à la fois techniquement rationnel et humainement insensé. »)⁸

With this individual and social dissatisfaction, however, Ricœur notes a strange paradox. Modern nations are compelled to compete technologically for survival. Yet in committing to a dominant technical-economic pattern they are eroding or dissolving the political/ethical social core. (« .. d’une part, c’est pour survivre que les nations modernes doivent entrer dans la compétition technologique ; mais dans cette mesure même, elle se livrent à l’action dissolvante exercée par la technologie devenue souveraine sur le noyau éthico-politique de ces sociétés. »)⁹ The individual is then caught in this contradiction between the logic of industrialization and the political/ethical democratic tradition. (« L’homme des sociétés industrielles avancées, placé au carrefour de l’économique et du politique, souffre de la contradiction entre la logique de l’industrialisation et la vieille rationalité relevant de l’expérience politique des peuples. »)¹⁰ This causes many, he says, to simply retreat to private life (la « privatisation » du bonheur). This second example is not as vivid as the individual caught in a crushing Marxist/totalitarian economic system. Yet following the author’s argument, the problem with technical-economic rationality, especially economic pressure diminishing the political/ethical social core as noted, is quite serious in its own way.

(End of the Ricœur-only citation area.)

The Congressional Text Humanities Role and Technical-Economic Rationality

The US government educational mission or role provided by the congressional text emphasizes the importance of the humanities and related high standards. Currently, however, aspects of this role are severely disrupted by (largely) economic factors. To begin considering this role disruption, the following quotation from “Sur l’art de masse” (“About Mass Art”) by Roger Pouivet is given:

À la fin de 1997, en quelques semaines, plusieurs dizaines de millions de personnes ont vu le film Titanic. Ce film est exemplaire de ce qu’on entendra par une œuvre d’art de masse : faite pour un public planétaire, diffusée par des moyens techniques de communication, son accès est intellectuellement facile et direct parce qu’elle ne suppose ni exécution ni interprétation. L’art de masse se rencontre à la télévision, au cinéma, grâce à la vidéo, au disque, dans la littérature grand public, la photographie de mode ou publicitaire. Dans la vie de la plupart des gens, aujourd’hui, les œuvres de l’art de masse occupent une place bien plus grande que les œuvres « classiques ». Ce dernier terme est appliqué ici aux œuvres faites pour un public restreint, qui ne requièrent pas de moyens techniques de communication et dont l’accès exige une culture humaniste. …¹¹

(In only a few weeks near the end of 1997, millions of people saw the movie Titanic. This film exemplifies mass art: made for a worldwide audience, distributed by communications technology, and as not involving sophisticated/skillful realization [“content”] or requiring interpretation, is intellectually easy and direct. These mass art principles are found in TV, movies, music, books for broad readership, fashion photography, and advertising. Today, mass art has a far larger role in people’s lives than any “classic” works of art. Here the latter term applies to works for a limited group, not requiring communications technology, requiring instead substantive humanities education (une culture humaniste).  …)

Several important points describing mass art, mass market “culture” products, or Mass Culture are found in the above excerpt. One notes also the final contrast with required study in the humanities. This contrast between Mass Culture decisively influenced by economic principles and the humanities linked with high standards forms the basis for the role disruption discussed here.

Before continuing to Mass Culture economic principles, limits should be mentioned. Mass Culture is a broad subject with many facets and substantial literature.¹²  The treatment here however emphasizes economic aspects and current conditions. The coverage is not historical and treats key features only. There is not, as with MacDonald, even a focus on “cultural items” per se. Such a comparative treatment (with a more comprehensive intent) is beyond the present scope.

Instead the focus is underlying ideas, principles, and certain relations. We are following the pattern of philosophical discussion and the influence of technical-economic rationality. The emphasis is on technical-economic rationality forming an economic framework and thus decisively influencing the type of humanities and high standards role found in the congressional text. The humanities area too is limited to key points of intersection or comparison with economic and Mass Culture aspects.

The economic principles related to Mass Culture covered here, then, form a selective group. Several are based on ideas from Pouivet, and are in any case conventional. This is part of their character as elements of a consistent, repeatable system in different Mass Culture areas (music, movies), and links them to other standard business systems. This in turn shows their connection to technical-economic rationality as an “abstract social mechanism”. One notes again these are economic ideas, yet they have extensive social/cultural dimensions.

Following the idea “mass”, maximization is the unifying abstract (economic) idea. This applies to consumption (Pouivet, worldwide audience), profit, and production. To achieve this objective standardized business structures and methods are used, with some aspects emphasized for Mass Culture. Despite “cultural” product status, features like efficiency driven division of labor (MacDonald) are characteristic. Maximum efficiency in storage and distribution is facilitated by standardized communication technology (Pouivet).

The linkage across areas such as movies and music with technology, especially IT, as well as marketing through mass media is well known, yet essential to note as part of the abstract system. As Pouivet observes, simplified, easy to understand content is also highly characteristic. Certainly simplicity makes developing content faster and more efficient. With not having high aesthetic standards, or a required higher talent (and training) level, this greatly extends the potential range of writers, performers, etc. able to contribute “creatively”. With this we see generally simple content has a central functional, systematic role; maximum production, consumption, and distribution are all supported by this feature.

Considered then as part of an abstract Mass Culture system, simplified content occupies an important place. It is a standard feature, or abstract idea, among a group of other largely required features. And despite enormous production levels of “cultural items” in individual areas, like music or TV, a kind of variety of sheer quantity, the systematic unity across these areas is apparent (Pouivet). These business structures, rules, and requirements thus have strong implications for both what is produced and how; the scale of production should illustrate, not obscure, the essential underlying technical-economic principles involved.

This does not mean of course the vast number of Mass Culture consumers have no awareness of the strongly economic character of these cultural practices. Stars are by definition wealthy business people. This is apparently part of their allure as “culture heroes.” Clearly the Mass Culture system, a vast economic/social enterprise, has overwhelming acceptance (Pouivet).

It is against this decisively economic Mass Culture backdrop that we turn to the role of the humanities and high standards suggested by the congressional text. The description here is brief, in part to avoid repetition. In particular, we note autonomy as a key element for high standards. The European art traditions serve as main sources for comparison. Each area such as English literature or classical music literature has its own internal standards and values. This is not to suggest any exact canon for them. Yet the artists (Shakespeare, Mozart) and works reflect a kind of internal striving for excellence, quite apart from the Mass Culture system pressures noted. Despite the relative obviousness of these examples, the larger point must be insisted on: The congressional text education and humanities role is clearly based on such works. The works and the standards they represent are not based on  economic, but on scholarly or artistic values.

Again, these humanities and standards ideas are given as central to the federal educational mission or role. They are still part of public school teaching; their place in postsecondary education is diminishing. There is little evidence for considering the congressional text educational role successful, however, if one considers the dominance of Mass Culture compared to the very minor social presence of the humanities and related standards. Clearly the federal educational role, despite effort, is disrupted.

Explaining the disruption of the educational role could take many forms. The problem is large and complex. As noted, the focus here is limited to certain (largely) economic reasons. Thus the most direct explanation is the ongoing overwhelming presence and social acceptance of Mass Culture. It is a solidly entrenched mass market product system. The system and products have a powerful, normative place. Mass Culture is accepted across social, income, and educational levels. The arts and humanities “idea,” with associated standards, has for the general public been largely lost. The arts and humanities no longer represent, apparently, a special category of attainment.  Even more, the strange or aberrant idea is to consider these concerns or this loss a problem. In a word, instead of pursuing substantive arts and humanities, we get our “culture” from the entertainment business.

Thus the acceptance of this economic/cultural system shows, again, an essentially different view of content and quality. In the arts as traditionally taught, special literatures and high standards formed the basis of instruction. Questions concerning what to teach and why were defining instructional considerations. Arts and humanities areas were understood to require autonomy in the pursuit of special values. With Mass Culture, as noted however, content is essentially required to be easy and accessible. This serves the profit motive and other maximizing features. With this, Mass Culture practices subordinate quality to economic values. This general comparison thus shows one area defined by striving for high standards, the other with basic economic reasons for holding to simplified content, and in this sense against such standards.

These reasons only explain in part how the congressional text educational role is disrupted. Certainly others are available. Yet the overwhelming, fixed presence of Mass Culture and its extensive social acceptance, regulated by decisive technical-economic factors, clearly requires attention for this problem.

     III. Conclusion

This final section affirms the congressional text educational role for the humanities, and revisits other central matters. Of these matters, the material from Éthique et politique by Ricœur provides the main conceptual basis with technical-economic rationality and rational political principles. These categories align well as philosophical principles with the congressional text despite otherwise separate purposes. The “abstract social mechanism” Ricœur describes, based on technical-economic rationality, was shown in relation to varying forms; as central to modern self-understanding, in comparison with the “historical community;” and to areas not found in Ricœur, as with the technical-economic influence in Mass Culture.

Ricœur’s rationalité politique was described, in limited form, as centered on historical developments leading to the nation of laws, the modern state. His special emphasis on the ethical achievements of this development, and the related central role of the citizen was noted. In his view, a central democratic state function is the ongoing process of integrating prominent social “forces,” concerns. This should include technical-economic rationality, and thus political philosophy requires considerable autonomy. Yet, as he notes, there is a strong tendency for technical-economic rationality (in various senses) to erode the political/ethical social core, to disrupt properly political functions.

In this tendency toward domination/disruption by technical-economic rationality, variously described, the linkage between the Ricœur and the congressional texts is quite apparent. (Holding to Ricœur’s “rationality” term.) Concerning the humanities, this disruption is seen, in part, with the overwhelming presence and acceptance of Mass Culture. This effect is surely detrimental not just to traditional high culture, but to folk and other arts; ¹³ as the congressional text stresses, the US has a strong multicultural heritage deserving real attention. Thus there is more at stake than preserving and studying European masterworks, as important as this is for substantive humanities education.

There are then many reasons for reaffirming the congressional text stress on balanced education, high standards, and the humanities, with only a few noted here. It is apparent that the ideas and pursuits of technical-economic rationality have a firm hold on the imaginations of many US citizens. Reasons for this vary, but no one doubts the impressive, even stunning successes of the natural sciences and related areas. Yet the need for serious political and social engagement remains. This attention to properly philosophic and related humanistic concerns, provided to as many US citizens as possible, is again a central objective of the educational role from the congressional text. One hopes this aspect of American identity, with its encouraging note of idealism and potential social progress, might find greater support in a more balanced educational future.

 Notes

1          National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-209).             (http://www.neh.gov/about/history/national-foundation-arts-and-humanities-act-1965-pl-89-209)

2         Whitehead, Alfred North. Science and the Modern World, p. 176. “Wisdom is the fruit of a balanced development. It is this balanced growth of individuality which it should be the aim of education to secure.”

3          Hoffman, Thomas Sören. „Würde versus Vernutzung des Menschen: Ein Einspruch aus philosophischer Sicht,“ (www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/kbe/Hoffmann01.doc) ; Manzeschke, Arne. „Hintergrundinformation Ökonomisierung“, Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) (https://www.ekd.de/sozialethik/download/Oekonomisierung.pdf); Two (of many) studies treating similar themes.

4          Ricœur, Paul. Éthique et politique. In: Autres Temps. Les cahiers du christianisme social. N°5, 1985. pp. 58-70. doi : 10.3406/chris.1985.1000 (http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/chris_0753-2776_1985_num_5_1_1000)

5          Ricœur cites Hanna Arendt and Eric Weil with this material, and varies terms according to the scope; “sphère économico-sociale” is thus specifically employed here as more comprehensive. “Technical-economic rationality” is the term relating the opposition to “political rationality”, and in this his standard term for the idea group. P. 59.

6          Ricœur, p. 63.

7          Ricœur, p. 61.

8          Ricœur, p. 61.

9          Ricœur, p. 62.

10        Ricœur, p. 62.

11         Pouivet, Roger. « Sur l’art de masse », Médium, 2005/1 (N°2). (http://www.cairn.info/revue-medium-2005-1-page-74.htm)

12        MacDonald, Dwight. “A Theory of Mass Culture”; Pouivet, Roger. ; Adorno and Horkheimer, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception”; Lasch, Christopher. “Mass Culture Reconsidered”; etc.

13        MacDonald, p. 13.