(Article No. 2) Remarks on the influence of materialism.     by Edward Eggleston

“No farmer is more slave to his plow, than a gentleman following the clock of fashion”.    

— W.H. Auden, “The Rake’s Progress”

… And so we express our “freedom”: by an increasing economic servitude.

A few prefatory comments before discussing philosophic materialism. We live in a time of a large, gradual social transition, an increasing commercialization of American society. This is widely noticed, sometimes criticized, and (apparently) generally accepted. There are great material benefits with this, yet many problems. A general example is the effect on arts and humanities cultural efforts. More specifically, one finds the gradual fall of music as a literate practice, largely covered or replaced with non-literate Mass Culture music. This may be of little concern for many, but it is a clear instance of cultural decline. Among other possible examples, the loss of musical literacy shows the effects of commercial practices and values displacing culture of high intrinsic value. Yet as noted the commercialization of society reaches beyond the effects on arts and humanities.

Another example of the commercialization of society is widely seen, often in negative terms. This is the commercial influence on Christmas. There are several reasons for offering this example, although as an analogy it is limited.

For comparison we note then that the commercial influence on Christmas has been gradual, is now firmly set, and accepted; though often with reservations. Further, there is a traditional core, a group of “real reasons” for the holiday. These are typically regarded as of primary importance. There is frequent agreement that the commercial influence is excessive; and this is a key word. Someone making the common claim of excess will likely not be branded “anti-business”. It is more a complaint of commercial activity impinging in some fashion on the “spirit of Christmas”; that this has a larger, higher intrinsic meaning and value that excess commercialism affects in very negative ways. Thus with the very real gains of commercial activity in this area, there can be, and arguably are significant losses.

Also, understanding this problem of excess is mainly interpretive and philosophical in nature. The excess is judgement of ideas and their relationships, not commercial measurements per se (i.e. sales numbers). This point must be emphasized. The judgement here is largely external to “the markets”. A larger, basic philosophical “area” must be held in order to compare ideas, not just see economics in its own terms and measures. In returning to the commercialization of society theme, this is a primary problem. Economic activity becomes the only valid frame of reference. Yet the examples of music and Christmas require holding other values and intellectual perspectives. A significant problem with the commercialization of society is just this issue; a strong tendency, in the predominant market radicalization or “neoliberal” forms, to impose commercial systems and values on previously more autonomous areas.

The following excerpts from “Criticism of Neoliberalism” mention Germany, yet the principles certainly apply fully to the US. These brief texts provide a definition of neoliberalism and a sense of the scope of the issues. (A translation follows the original texts.)

Aus „Kritik des Neoliberalismus“. Christoph Butterwegge, Bettina Lösch,Ralf Ptak; Unter Mitarbeit von Tim Engartner

(„Kritik des Neoliberalismus“. Christoph Butterwegge, Bettina Lösch, Ralf Ptak; Unter Mitarbeit von Tim Engartner 1. Auflage 2007 © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2007 http://www.vs-verlag.de)

„Einleitung:

»Neoliberalismus« steht für eine seit den 1930er-Jahren entstandene Lehre, die den Markt als Regulierungsmechanismus gesellschaftlicher Entwicklungs- und Entscheidungsprozesse verabsolutiert. Es handelt sich um eine breite geistige Strömung mit unterschiedlichen historischen wie länderspezifischen Erscheinungsformen, Strategievarianten und Praktiken. Eigentlich müßte man von »Neoliberalismen« sprechen, die sich auf verschiedene theoretische Ansätze und Konzepte zur Umsetzung stützen. Das Gesellschaftspolitische Projekt des Neoliberalismus strebt nach einem Kapitalismus ohne wohlfahrtsstaatliche Begrenzungen.“ (p.5)

 „Die meisten Repräsentanten des Neoliberalismus verwenden diesen Terminus nicht zur Selbstetikettierung, weil sie darin einen politischen Kampfbegriff oder ein Schimpfwort sehen. Auch unter seinen Kritiker(inne)n sind die Einfluß- und Handlungsmöglichkeiten des Neoliberalismus umstritten: Manche hielten sein Ende schon für gekommen, bevor er in der Bundesrepublik zur vollen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Wirkungsmächtigkeit gelangte. Bis heute bestimmt der Neoliberalismus die Tagespolitik, die Medienöffentlichkeit und das Massenbewußtsein hierzulande jedoch so stark wie keine andere Weltanschauung.“ (p.5)

(„Criticism of Neoliberalism“.

 Introduction:

“Neoliberalism“ refers to a doctrine developed since the 1930s that positions the market as an absolute or unrestricted control mechanism for social development and decision making processes. It concerns a broad intellectual stream with different historical and country-specific adaptations, strategy types, and practices. One should really say (then) “Neoliberalisms“, based on developing various theoretical premises and ideas. As a sociopolitical project Neoliberalism strives for capitalism without social welfare system/state limitations.

 Most representatives of Neoliberalism do not use this term to describe themselves, because it is seen as derisive or intended for political attack. Among its critics also, the influence and activity potential (options) of Neoliberalism are disputed: Some saw its endpoint reached, even before it achieved great political and social power in Germany. Yet to the present [in Germany], Neoliberalism determines (public) policy, Mass Media, and broad public awareness more strongly than any other world view.)

„Das neoliberale Denken ist in fast alle Lebensbereiche eingedrungen und seine Hegemonie, d.h. die öffentliche Meinungsführerschaft des Marktradikalismus, deshalb nur schwer zu durchbrechen. Trotzdem regt sich immer häufiger Protest, weil die innere Widersprüchlichkeit des Neoliberalismus klarer zutage tritt und seine negativen Konsequenzen für die Gesellschaft, den Wohlfahrtsstaat und die Demokratie inzwischen  unübersehbar sind.“ (p.5)

 (Neoliberal thought has expanded into almost every area of life and its hegemony, that is, the public opinion leadership of market radicalism, is very difficult to break through. Despite this protest is more frequent, because the internal contradictions of Neoliberalism are more apparent and its negative consequences for society, the social welfare system, and democracy cannot be overlooked.)

„Wer – wie mancher Neoliberaler – die kapitalistische Ökonomie verabsolutiert, negiert im Grunde demokratische Politik und repräsentative Demokratie, weil beide Mehrheitsentscheidungen und nicht das Privateigentum an Produktionsmitteln zum Fixpunkt gesellschaftlicher Entwicklungsprozesse machen.“ (p. 140)

(Whoever – as with many Neoliberal proponents – positions the capitalistic economy as absolute, fundamentally negates democratic politics and representative democracy, for both require majority decision making — and not private ownership of the means of production – as the central point of social development processes.) (emphasis added)

The excerpts offer neoliberalism as a collective term for the commercialization of society process first noted. The time frame leads to the present. Part I of the following remarks on materialism will lead to this point. The sequence of part I first covers materialism and definitions, moving then to social Darwinism and neoliberalism. This is similar to the pattern of Sautter discussing Hayek, and parts of Sautter’s work will appear also. Part I then indicates the ongoing influence of materialism, especially as incorporated into certain forms of neoliberal thought.

(“Anthropologische Fundamente der westlichen Wirtschaftsordnung”. Sautter, Hermann. Göttingen. http://www.iguw.de/uploads/media/Sautter_H_Fundamente-Wirtschaftsordnung_IGUW.pdf)

Part II extends and discusses material of part I, largely adapting Ricœur’s idea of “technical-economic rationality” and its influence as a “cultural solvent”. With this as well, materialism shows a continuing if indirect influence. (Ricœur, p.59-62)

(« Éthique et politique ». Ricœur, Paul. Autres Temps. Les cahiers du christianisme social. Année 1985. Volume 5, Numéro 1, pp. 58-70. http://www.persee.fr/doc/chris_0753-2776_1985_num_5_1_1000)

Remarks on the influence of materialism. Part I.

Certain concepts and their derivations become so pervasive as to seem to escape notice, and (philosophical) materialism is such a concept. So widely accepted, it becomes finally an unnoticed aspect of our “climate of opinion”. The definitions of the term vary. These definitions and their use reflect levels of strictness. This quality of strictness is of special interest, despite (apparent) limited attention. The natural sympathy for and adoption of aspects of materialism is understandable, as linked to natural science. Yet stricter forms of materialism in direct socio-economic uses raise serious questions. It is well beyond the scope of these remarks to cover such large social or economic issues in detail. The intention here is to direct attention, briefly, to aspects of materialism. Even within this limited scope, however, one can give an impression of the importance of the ideas involved. Materialism may have disappeared somewhat into our climate of opinion, but its influence is very strong. The following definition by Riecken offers a starting point. (A translation follows the original text.)

(„Materialismus-vs-idealismus“. Riecken, Maik.  riecken.de/index.php/2008/03/materialismus-vs-idealismus)

„Materialismus“.        „Der Begriff Materialismus leitet sich von Materie ab. Unter ihm wird eine philosophische Grundposition verstanden, die alle Vorgänge und Phänomene der Welt auf ein einziges Grundprinzip, nämlich die Materie zurückführt. Selbst immaterielle Phänomene (z.B. Gedanken) sind lediglich durch materielle Vorgänge ausgelöst worden. Alles was sich dem naturwissenschaftlich Belegbaren entzieht, ist im Materialismus nicht wirklich, sodass dort es z.B. keinen Gott oder sonstige transzendentalen Kräfte gibt.

Demnach ist die Natur für einen Materialisten das höchste Prinzip. Wenn der Mensch ausschließlich der Natur und ihren Gesetzen folgt, wird sich sein Leben automatisch vervollkommnen. Schlüssel für ein erfolgreiches und damit wertvolles Leben ist also die Erkenntnis der Natur.

Der Mensch ist durch das Grundprinzip der Natur determiniert, besitzt also strenggenommen keinen eigenen Willen, sondern nur einen, der durch die ihn ausmachende Materie „verursacht“ worden ist. Er ist gewissermaßen Objekt der ihn bestimmenden Kräfte.

Der Natur arbeiten von Menschen künstlich geschaffene Prinzipien entgegen. Als Beispiele sind hier die Moral oder die Religion zu nennen. Auch bestimmte Gesellschaftsformen können den Menschen von dem Urprinzip der Natur entfremden. Eine zu verurteilende Handlung ist für einen Materialisten also eine Handlung gegen das Prinzip der Natur, gewissermaßen die Entfremdung vom Urzustand, durch z.B. Moral oder Religion.

Kritiker des Materialismus werfen ihm vor, dass er die Tatsache ignoriert, dass letztlich unsere Sinne bestimmen, wie die Welt – und damit die Materie – aussieht. Er beschreibt also lediglich unsere wahrgenommene Vorstellungswelt. Gleichzeitig ist der Materialismus selbst als philosophische Richtung nicht Materie oder durch Materie erklärbar, wie es der Materialismus für alles fordert und damit für seine Kritiker ein Widerspruch ansich.“

(Materialism.   Materialism as a concept derives from the term matter. This concept indicates a basic philosophic position, where all processes and phenomena of the world refer back to matter as a basic principle. Even immaterial phenomena (for example ideas) are solely understood by material processes. Anything not provable by natural science is not real in materialism; thus God or other transcendent powers do not exist.

It follows then that for a materialist nature is the highest principle. If a person follows nature and natural laws exclusively, their life will be automatically perfected. So the key for a successful and thus worthwhile life is knowledge of nature.

Since human beings are determined by the basic principle of “nature”, strictly speaking they do not have their own will, but only one “caused” by the effects of matter. A person is so to speak the object of determinant forces. Artificial principles made by humans work against nature. Morality and religion serve as examples of this. Certain forms of society can also separate the person from nature as an original principle. Thus an action against the nature principle, according to a materialist, invites condemnation; this is, again as with morality or religion, a kind of action against (or alienation from) our original, natural state.

Critics accuse materialism of ignoring the fact that our senses determine, finally, how the world and matter appear. It is only then describing our ideas of the world as perceived. At the same time, materialism itself as a philosophical position is not matter, or explained through matter; thus it does not meet its own criteria, which critics view as an internal contradiction.)

Before commenting, two ideas are noted. Some points given are little more than repetition. Others are extended or derived. These extensions or possible consequences can illustrate the potential severity or strictness mentioned earlier.

The most obvious and perhaps far reaching point is the basic linkage of matter and natural science. Strictly taken, then, there is no other knowledge, or comparable intellectual authority. From this epistemological position, any humanistic effort (i.e., a historical work) is necessarily secondary; and (again) may not be considered knowledge at all. As found in the definition, religions are simply “artificial”, as cultural rather than natural. The potential for reducing or excluding any knowledge outside natural science is clear.

With these brief observations about materialism and knowledge, we turn to materialism as “human image”. This is a more explicit and extended set of views, more humanly definitive, and serves to introduce materialism in certain social applications. Beginning with this excerpt from Schart’s “Menschenbilder im schematischen Vergleich” (A schematic comparison of human images), the interpretive emphasis is generally more strict, thus outlining consequences. This should clarify the meaning of extending materialism to life in society. (Again a translation follows.)

(Schart, Aaron. „Menschenbilder im schematischen Vergleich“. Last edited: 2007-04-05. Bearbeitet von Jürgen Ehle. http://www.uni-due.de/~gev020/courses/course-stuff/menschenbilder-schema.htm)

Menschenbilder im schematischen Vergleich

Materialistisches Menschenbild

(A schematic comparison of human images. Materialistic human image.

God, being, sense/meaning:   God plays no role: there is only matter, and no independently existing spirit behind or over it. Soul and spirit are nothing but a function of the complexity of matter. Therefore the only generally valid values are material (values): life is devouring and being devoured (ein Fressen und gefressen werden): All life strives for satisfying drives and needs. Poverty and distress arise when these needs cannot be sufficiently satisfied. The purpose of all life is thus securing the material basis of living.

Philosophical forms: Positivism, Marxism, Utilitarianism

Knowledge:   Only sense impressions exist and are knowable. Knowledge = sense impressions/perception and interpretation of the material world and its material connections.

Knowledge acquisition method: methods of the natural sciences

Motivation:   Everything strives for egoistic satisfaction of drives. Only what is materially effective and serves to satisfy drives is justified. This means creating a world where this is possible for all people: for example, Marxism or Capitalism.

Human value/worth:   A human being has no value in and of itself (aus sich selbst heraus). A human is an object: What does the other person bring me in terms of material advantage and use? Another person is only worth what he can bring me or to society as socially useful (= material needs satisfaction).

Criteria for human worth/value:

Ability to work

Ability to perform (well)

Material usefulness, benefit, profit

Usability (Verwertbarkeit)

— Other categories follow in the original)

Schart’s rather stark (and implicitly critical) materialistic human image suggests a bleak view of the human condition. Atheism is given default status, and material values dominate human life. The highest principle is survival of the strong (fittest); thus struggle, competition, the human as biologically controlled; a general rule of determinism as inescapable; as with Riecken we find then no authentic free will. It is a system with little or no place for ethical principle. In this natural order all human goals are material. These simply reflect human life as determined, biologically driven. A human image and consequences given in this general pattern are not new, of course. But the implications, both individual and social, are worth a moment of reflection.

Perhaps this reflection leads to concluding Schart’s version is unusual, as in unusually strict in following premise to conclusion. Yet the materialistic human image of the economist Hayek, according to Sautter, is very similar. (p.9-19 for the Sautter-Hayek references in this section. See note for Sautter above.) Hayek, of course, is a leading economic theorist of the neoliberal group. Again following Sautter’s description, Hayek draws his human image and basic orientation from Scottish Enlightenment philosophy, especially Hume and Adam Smith. Reason is thus subservient to biological drives, or “slave to the passions” (Hume). With Hayek the person is capable of learning, but reason is limited more to “calculation”. In this general pattern, the person is not really capable of reasoning to grasp final ends or values. Reason is viewed as more immediate, devoted to narrower problem solving. Sautter notes that for Hayek moral agency is largely illusory. Thus the linkage from Riecken to Schart, and to Sautter’s description of Hayek is fairly direct. Free will is subordinate to biological determinism. This has disturbing ethical consequences.

Sautter notes further that from Hayek’s materialistic human image, responsibility (Verantwortlichkeit) is no longer a moral issue. This is replaced by calculation. A grasp of conditions and results. A vivid socio-economic example shows how this might be applied. At a given point in US history, slavery is legal. Thus abolition is not a matter of ethics, or social responsibility. It is a calculation, a “business decision”. This illustrates how dramatic and consequential these “merely” theoretical or philosophical ideas may become as socially realized.

This is reinforced by Schart noting that from a strict materialistic view, human beings are objects. Thus they have no intrinsic value. As objects of “logical calculation”, we might ask: what material advantage does this person bring me? How are they useful (for me)? Repeating the questions from Schart simply echoes the moral vacuum possible following Sautter’s view of Hayek’s ideas.

It is important to underline ethical problems of stricter materialistic views, despite the repetition. The issue may be well worn, but deserves attention. The related reduction of reason to calculation too is an aspect worth stressing.

The idea of strictness in considering materialism is also, one notes, not just a matter of outside interpretation. The nature of the premises of materialism point to extreme or absolute positions. Thus matter is an absolute category, and natural science the only form of knowledge. The use of this, again, as a set of assumptions for natural science is one thing. The move from “the lab to society” is rather different.

The social application of materialism related ideas may be shown again by the term social Darwinism. There is of course a large literature on this topic. For this limited discussion, the following excerpts by Lenzen offer useful points, especially the historical background linking social Darwinism and economics. (Trans. follow)

(„Sozialdarwinismus“. Lenzen, Manuela. http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/214188/was%ADist%ADsozialdarwinismusPfad)

„Sozialdarwinismus“. Manuela Lenzen.

„Sozialdarwinismus“ stand … für Versuche, die Entwicklung von Gesellschaften und sozialen Verhältnissen als „Kampf ums Dasein“ (struggle for existence) zu beschreiben, in dem nur die Besten, die Stärksten oder Erfolgreichsten überleben (survival of the fittest)”. (p.1)

(Social Darwinism. Manuela Lenzen.

Social Darwinism … attempts to describe the development of societies and social relations as a struggle for existence, in which only the best, the strongest, or the most successful survive: survival of the fittest.)

“Spencer stand mit seiner Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Evolution auf dem Boden des Liberalismus: alle Menschen hätten die gleiche Freiheit, sich im Kampf ums Dasein zu behaupten; Eingriffe des Staates in das Wirtschaftsleben lehnte er ab. Dieser Laissez faire oder Manchester Liberalismus ist typisch für die frühen Formen des Sozialdarwinismus, der davon ausging, dass ebenso wie das blinde Naturgeschehen zu einer Höherentwicklung der Lebewesen, auch das blinde Spiel der Marktkräfte zum Fortschritt der Gesellschaft führe”. (p.2)

(With his theory of social evolution, Spencer stood on the ground of liberalism: everyone would have the same freedom to take part in the struggle for existence. [With this,] Spencer rejected state intervention in economic life. This laissez-faire or Manchester liberalism is typical for early forms of social Darwinism, which asserted that just as blind natural events led to higher development for a given organism, the blind play of market forces led to social progress.)

“Die Beurteilung von Menschen nach ihrer ökonomischen Leistungsfähigkeit bringen Forscher häufig mit der als immer bedrohlicher empfundenen „Macht des Marktes“ zusammen. „Marktkonformen und marktförmigen Extremismus“ nennen die Autoren der „Fragile Mitte“ Studie das Weltbild hinter Positionen, die das Recht der Stärkeren verherrlichen und die ökonomisch Schwächeren verachten. An die Stelle humanistischer, ziviler und demokratischer Werte und Normen, auf deren Basis entschieden werde, wer in der Gesellschaft dazugehört und welchen Platz er oder sie einnehmen solle, träten immer stärker die Wertmaßstäbe der Wirtschaftlichkeit. In der Folge würden ökonomische Kriterien vermehrt auch zur Bewertung von Bevölkerungsgruppen angewandt”. (p.3) ( …  )

„ … den Forschern zufolge … reiche er [der marktförmige Extremismus] über die Selbstoptimierungs und  Wettbewerbsideologie in die Mitte der Gesellschaft hinein. Die Anerkennung der Gleichwertigkeit der Menschen aber sei das Fundament der Demokratie, betonen sie als zentralen Punkt. Vor dem Hintergrund einer Ideologie der Ungleichwertigkeit könne sich schließlich die ganze Macht von Stereotypen, Vorurteilen und politischen Ideologien der Minderwertigkeit von Menschengruppen entfalten”. (p.3)

(… The judgement of people according to their economic achievement abilities frequently brings researchers to note the always threatening “power of the markets”. The authors of the “fragile middle” study call this worldview “market-conformity and market-based extremism”, and see this behind positions that glorify the rights of the powerful and despise the economically weak. In place of humanistic, civil, and democratic values and norms, seen as a basis for deciding who belongs in the society and what place he or she should have, the value measurements of the economy are considered with increasing strength. As a consequence, economic criteria are more frequently applied to judge a given social group. …)

[… according to previously noted researchers] : ( … by means of the personal performance and competition ideologies, market-based extremism extends to the middle of society. However, the recognition of equal value of the person is the basis of democracy, which these researchers stress as a central point. With an ideological background of unequal human value, then, we could instead encourage the development of stronger forms of stereotypes, prejudice, and political ideologies of diminished human worth for certain social groups.)

Lenzen provides several useful points for this overview. With the basic definition of social Darwinism she notes also the early connection with Spencer and liberal economic theory. This provides part of the historical frame for Hayek and the later development of neoliberalism. The application of social Darwinism to economics is noted also to raise immediate ethical concerns, and as a threat to central democratic values. Thus drawing on earlier materials added to these excerpts, a historically recurrent but variable pattern is noticeable – with stress on the term variable. Yet there is a line of development or extension here, with materialism as a starting point.

The outline of influence, as briefly developed in this discussion, moves then from materialism to a materialistic human image. The pattern of social Darwinism can derive, as noted, from this image. The application of social Darwinism to economic theory and systems has a certain history. As given above, neoliberalism is a collective term used for this pattern expressed in recent history, leading to the present.

It is important to add, however, that some negative aspects treated here are not so much necessary (as an outcome), but show instead a strong potential for problems with these ideas. Lenzen discusses how social Darwinism (principles) can undermine democratic values such as equality. In an economic setting, social Darwinism as radicalized competition or market principles, a form of economic “might makes right” is presented as a threat to individuals and groups that are not economically powerful. Other forms of (social) value are threatened, but this outcome might be mitigated. Such distinctions are important to make clear. One unifying theme developed in this short discussion is the influence of (philosophical) materialism. Stressing the potential (and sometimes realized) influence of certain concepts is not the same as categorically rejecting, for example, market systems.

Part II 

Questions of the influence of (philosophical) materialism continue in this second section. As before, however, this influence will often be absorbed into other idea groups. The term influence itself used here requires additional explanation, as will its relation to the analytic framework employed. This framework or philosophical “area” noted in the introduction is more than just functional; maintaining these analytic categories is itself a core theme. This basic frame is reflected as well in the material here from Ricœur, and is the essence of his modern paradox idea: our technical-economic systems provide great benefit yet cause real social problems, in acting as a cultural “solvent”. Recognizing the scope of this problem requires a larger framework for humanistic/philosophical review. Remarks follow this material from Ricœur’s “Éthique et politique”, complimented with a brief addition by Juignet on relativism. Materialism is then treated less directly in this second section, yet its connection to the main category (to follow) of technical-economic rationality is direct. Even as absorbed in this larger scheme the influence of materialism is found as a core idea.

(Juignet, Patrick. L’idéologie néolibérale. Philosophie, science et société [en ligne]. 2015. http://www.philosciences.com)

As used in this discussion influence reflects two basic meanings. One meaning is more internal, as with materialism serving as a premise. The other meaning is more external or contextual. The internal or premise form, then, suggests a chain of influence. This may be viewed as a sequence or history of ideas in a pattern. The earlier discussion of materialism from premise to social Darwinism reflects this internal form.

External or contextual influence, by contrast, suggests choice of a limited feature set for analysis and comparison. These chosen features will then be external to, for example, materialism serving as a premise. Ethical concerns emerging from a materialistic human image (in stricter form) reflect this second meaning of influence.

Taken together these two types of influence form a basic analytic structure. As mentioned, these analytic categories are reflected also in material from Ricœur to follow. Thus the previously noted internal influence of materialism is associated or linked with Ricœur’s technical-economic rationality. (See note on terms below.) The previous external influence type, a context for selective philosophic review, is linked with Ricœur’s political-ethical category (rationalité politique). In this way the ideas (content) and the analytic form are joined and maintained. Maintaining this two part form also serves the interpretive purpose, the insistent idea suggested by the contextual review category, of actually holding technical-economic rationality “to account” – maintaining an adequate review form, where business, science, and technology are considered outside their own measurements and systems. (Even on a modest scale.) The implications of this should not be glossed over — especially those concerning ethics. A selected group of such implications are treated in the material to follow by Ricœur.

(Note on terms: Ricœur cites Hanna Arendt and Eric Weil with his social/economic material, and varies terms according to the scope; “sphère économico-sociale” is thus specifically employed here as more comprehensive. “Technical-economic rationality” is the term relating the opposition to “political rationality”, and in this his standard term for the idea group. P. 59.)

(The immediately following italicized section is from the present writer’s “Remarks on the 1965 Arts and Humanities Act”, https://eke03.wordpress.com/2015/11/12/remarks-on-the-1965-arts-and-humanities-act . As marked there, the central source for this section is Ricœur’s 1985 “Éthique et politique”. [Also above, p.1.] Direct quotes are cited. A similar note marks the end of this section.)

“In his article “Éthique et politique”, Ricœur develops two opposing, basic categories. The first is “a technical-economic rationality” (la rationalité techno-économique), the second “a political rationality” or perhaps better, “rational political principles” (rationalité politique). Despite slight changes by context, these terms represent very consistent idea groups or forms of “rationality.” It should be noted the following is merely an overview of these categories.

 Technical-economic rationality is described with several key features. The organized struggle against nature (lutte contre nature), the methodical organization of work, and rationalized relations between production, distribution, and consuming are central. The author stresses the abstract character of these features, describing the group as comprising an “abstract social mechanism” (mécanisme social abstrait). This will be contrasted later with the important concept of a concrete “historical community” (communauté historique), the social basis for rational political principles. Among other aspects, Ricœur sees this abstract/universal character as important on the individual and larger social levels. For the individual, the abstract rationality with universal application is key to a modern self-understanding, even a form of instruction in reason as such. The individual sees the transnational application and the characteristic “modernity” of this technical-economic mode of thought. For society, Ricœur emphasizes the role this technical-economic thought pattern contributed to the idea of a modern state. The expansion of the “historical community” by means of the abstract principles of the rational struggle against nature is therefore a defining feature.

Ricœur thus makes clear that the technical-economic “abstract social mechanism” has a separable conceptual form, a distinct “rationality.” This form is strongly contrasted with the group “rational political principles.” It should be noted that this latter group is extensively developed, with more elements and a more complex structure. For our purposes here, however, a selective feature set is covered.

To begin describing this feature set, and move toward outlining a separable political “rationality,” the historical endpoint is given: the modern (Western) democratic state. Stating this goal provides an organizing principle against which other features, historical/developmental or conceptual, may be measured or understood. This makes clear also that despite aspects of Ricœur’s political principles seeming idealistic, as part of a purely theoretical discussion, his principles are actually rooted in interpreting essentially current democratic conditions.

 With noting the democratic state as unifying idea for the selected rational political principles, a word is offered on the term rational. It is not used in a special or unusual way. As with the democratic state as unifying concept, rational refers to the coherence of these political principles. It is a “fitting together” quality, a sense of internal relatedness of an idea group. This is the general sense of the term intended here. The specific qualities giving this general character result from relating the selected features.

 Of the features forming a subset (here) of Ricœur’s rational political principles, two require particular emphasis with the democratic state concept: citizenship and ethical intention. As will follow, Ricœur relates these three in a very pronounced way with historical/developmental and conceptual aspects. The resulting closeness and coherence of his formulation illustrates then their rationality, and distinctive character (among otherwise familiar ideas).

 Offered in overview fashion, the following gives (selected) features from Ricœur’s democratic state historical/developmental description: Earlier the idea of historical community was introduced as a concrete entity contrasted with technical-economic thought as an abstract social mechanism. This community is described as a distinct cultural unit, with a shared narrative, norms, and symbolic system. The state is formed from this historical community, its organization for making decisions. The division of emphasis on form or force for state development marks a turning point. In Ricœur’s description, form reflects the development of a nation of laws. In an important sense, the turn from arbitrary force to law reflects a more rational political philosophy. This finds expression in the late 18th century in the essentially modern democratic state, with constitutions, balance of powers, and independent judiciaries. The process described from historical community to democratic state in this overview pattern thus reflects stages of an integrative state development.

 Despite the philosophical/theoretical nature of this overview, the concrete historical community basis is key to Ricœur’s political principles. While the democratic state is a generalized goal, the basis in a particular community, with a shared past, present, and future is important to note. Features listed like norms and narratives suggest but do not capture the social meaning of these antecedent, or pre-state aspects. Once founded, the democratic state also reflects points of achievement. Ricœur stresses the elevation of the democratic citizen, with notable ethical gains. Together these ideas of national individuality and ethical development form (in part) the rationale for continuation of this political process. For the state’s future to be a continuation of this integrative process, a clear autonomy, a separable set of rational political principles are needed as an (ongoing) framework, a discernable foundation.”

These features of Ricœur’s rational political principles provided thus far can now be summarized. Our intention, again, is to provide an overview. The main features of this overview are gathered under four sections. Section one is the basic narrative pattern, or historical context. The second is the group of key elements or ideas. The basic relational description of these elements forms part three. The fourth is the philosophical distinctiveness of this group of principles, and its essential interpretive purpose. The following summary simply follows this order.

The narrative aspect of Ricœur’s political principles is essential. The integrative process from historical community to modern (Western) democratic state forms a historical context, and has strong implications for political/philosophical purposes and continuity. The pattern from concrete community to general democratic form – shared principles – places important stress on Ricœur’s view of the mixture of culturally distinct and more abstract political ideas.

The key elements and their relations contribute substantially to the distinct profile of his political principles. This is found despite the selectivity of this overview. The most emphasized features, now familiar, are the historical community, (Western) democratic state, the centrality of the citizen, and the particular ethical connection of the state/citizen feature. The nation of laws idea was presented also as central.

This special role of law in the democratic state is relational or structural as well. Ricœur describes this as woven through the historical and developmental process. Strong relational aspects are shown also by law as ethical intention made more explicit. This is critical at the larger level as a system. It is also essential for the central position of the citizen. Ricœur’s principles stress these interconnections of historical process and the expression of ethics in legal features of modern democracies.

The fourth area concerns philosophical distinctiveness and interpretive purpose. It should be said the political principles are described here more than treated in analytical detail. Ricœur offers naturally a more analytical presentation. Yet the clear pattern described, even as overview, demonstrates at least the coherence or “rationality” of his principles; the “fitting together” quality of key elements, relations, and historical context are noteworthy. This is the justification for offering these principles as a distinct philosophical category. As such, Ricœur’s political principles form an interpretive frame with, and contrast to, the category of technical-economic rationality. This interpretive frame of technical-economic rationality and Ricœur’s political principles form central parts of the context for the “paradox” and “cultural solvent” ideas that follow.

(From “Éthique et politique”)

« L’insatisfaction de l’homme des sociétés industrielles avancées

Permettez-moi … d’insister avec Eric Weil sur ce qu’il appelle l’insatisfaction de l’homme moderne : « l’individu dans la société moderne, écrit-il, est essentiellement insatisfait ». Pourquoi ? Pour au moins deux raisons. D’abord, parce que la société qui se définit uniquement en termes économiques est essentiellement une société de la lutte, de la compétition, où les individus sont empêchés d’accéder aux fruits du travail ; une société où les couches et les groupes s’affrontent sans arbitrage. Le sentiment d’injustice que la société rationnelle suscite, face à la division de la société en groupes, en couches, en classes, entretient l’isolement et l’insécurité de l’individu livré à la mécanique sociale ; d’un mot, le travail au niveau de la société économique en tant que telle, paraît à la fois techniquement rationnel et humainement insensé. » (Ricœur p. 61-62)

“The Dissatisfaction of Individuals in Advanced Industrial Societies

Allow me … to insist, with Eric Weil, on what he calls the dissatisfaction of individuals in our time…  — Why is this so? For at least two reasons. First, because the society defined only in economic terms is essentially marked by struggle, competition, where individuals are denied access to the abundance they see; a society where levels and groups confront one another without recourse. The sense of injustice the “rational society” brings forward, in view of the social divisions into groups, levels, classes, causing isolation and insecurity for the individual held in this “social mechanism”; in a word, work at the level of the „economized” society, as such, appears both technically rational and humanly senseless.” (emphasis added)

 « D’autre part, l’individu est insatisfait et même déchiré dans la société moderne du travail, parce qu’il ne trouve pas de sens dans la simple lutte contre la nature et l’apologie du calcul efficace. Cela est si vrai que, dans les sociétés industrielles avancées au moins, le sens est de plus en plus cherché hors du travail, le travail devenant un simple moyen pour gagner le loisir, lequel, à son tour, est organisé sur le modèle technique du travail… » (Ricœur p. 61-62)

 “Secondly, the individual is dissatisfied and even ruined in modern working conditions because the simple struggle against nature, justified by calculation and efficiency, appears (as well) as lacking real meaning. This is so true, that at least in advanced industrial societies, real meaning is sought more and more outside work, and work becomes simply a means for gaining leisure. This leisure, in turn, is organized on the “technical” model of work.” [TV, video games, computers]

 « C’est de cette double insatisfaction que procède le recours à la tradition vivante de la communauté historique, à ce fonds historique que précisément la société mondiale du travail organisé tend à réduire, à démanteler et à dissoudre. D’où l’étrange paradoxe dans lequel les sociétés avancées se trouvent aujourd’hui enfermées : d’une part, c’est pour survivre que les nations modernes doivent entrer dans la compétition technologique ; mais dans cette mesure même, elles se livrent à l’action dissolvante exercée par la technologie devenue souveraine sur le noyau éthico-politique de ces sociétés. »

 « L’homme des sociétés industrielles avancées, placé au carrefour de l’économique et du politique, souffre de la contradiction entre la logique de l’industrialisation et la vieille rationalité relevant de l’expérience politique des peuples. C’est pour fuir cette contradiction que tant de gens, jeunes et moins jeunes, refluent vers la vie privée, cherchant la survie dans la « privatisation » du bonheur. Cette protection féroce de l’enclos privé s’observe d’ailleurs dans toutes les sociétés industrielles avancées, qu’elles soient de l’Ouest ou de l’Est. » (Ricœur p. 61-62)

 “These two types of dissatisfaction (encourage) and precede the return to the living traditions of historical communities, cultural forms with historical depth – which, precisely, the (abstract/technical) global work systems tend to reduce, dismantle, and dissolve. From this we have the strange paradox advanced societies are currently locked into: on one hand, for survival modern nations have to compete technologically; but by this same activity, they give themselves to the dissolving forces of “sovereign” technology; and these forces are acting upon the political/ethical core of their nations.” (emphasis added)

 “People of advanced industrial societies, placed at the crossroads of economic and political concerns, suffer from the contradiction between the logic of industrialization and their traditional political principles and experiences. To escape this contradiction, many people, young and old, are driven to private life, seeking survival in “privatizing” their happiness. This forceful protection of a private sphere may be observed throughout advanced industrial societies, East and West.”  (End of main Ricœur citation area.)

In this commentary section we return to certain part I themes and offer remarks on Ricœur’s paradox and cultural solvent ideas. As he describes the frequent modern dissatisfaction, we find a society defined “only in economic terms”; this is clearly related to the commercialization of society mentioned before. Ricœur suggests that in such a society – in terms from part I, showing marked social Darwinism influences – these pressures foster confrontational social conditions. Struggle and competition are stressed. The individual and social groups are locked in a system governed by economic rules, with an inevitable sense of social injustice as a consequence. This domination of technical-economic rationality over ethical concern is summed up in his formulation of the economically determined nation: technically rational, yet humanly senseless. (Ricœur p.61-62)

The second cause of dissatisfaction Ricœur mentions is an extension of the first: for many, work is so heavily ruled by technical-economic logic that the individual has great difficulty finding personal/humanistic meaning in it. Maximum profit, maximum production, efficiency and competition, bound together and justified as (nearly) exclusive ends; individuals forced to adapt to (always changing) technology systems; thus the “serve the assembly line” logic applies, just as much, well beyond the factory floor. Pierre-Yves Gomez remarks on the managerial mindset of this:

« Le gouvernement des hommes dans l’entreprise libérale intègre un nombre grandissant de normes de comportements dits « rationnels » qui ont pour effet de nier la réalité qualitative des personnes au profit de calculs économiques quantitatifs qui sont des marqueurs : combien ils produisent, coûtent, consomment ou dépensent. » (Gomez, Pierre-Yves.  http://www.philanthropos.org/blog/enseignement/lentreprise-lepreuve-du-liberalisme)

“Managing individuals in the liberal enterprise involves an increasing number of behavioral norms called “rational”, which has, in consequence, the effect of denying the qualitative reality of the person in favor of economic, quantitative calculations: how much they produce, cost, consume, or spend.” (emphasis added)

Ricœur concludes that many in such systems find little consolation in the justification “by calculation and efficiency” for this struggle, this apparently sacrosanct economic determinism. Thus the individual is simply dissatisfied – or even ruined.

Confronted with a work system so heavily influenced by neoliberal ideas, the individual citizen searching for human (“qualitative”) meaning naturally turns to traditions associated with their historical communities. Ricœur does not provide this example, yet the frequent turn to religious tradition reflects such a reaction. The significant problem with this, however, is the cultural solvent idea. One aspect is the influence of technical-economic rationality in the commercialization of society, already discussed. A second refers back to part I: strict (philosophical) materialism (again as part of technical-economic rationality) removes the foundation for cultural or religious authority; thus such influence may lead directly to atheism; or at the least, will “tend to reduce, dismantle, and dissolve” any “living traditions of historical communities”. (Ricœur p.61-62) The point is the very strong influence, not a particular result. One must add that Ricœur does not use the terms “strict philosophical materialism”. This direct linkage of materialism and technical-economic principles is rather part of the present discussion, developing continuity between parts I and II. Again, the point is the culturally destabilizing effect of technical-economic rationality and its closely related ideas. The emphasis by this example, then, is for the potential influence on the individual.

In returning to the national level, we find the solvent effect in Ricœur’s paradox. “Advanced societies” increasingly embrace technical-economic principles, with all the implications involved, as needed for survival in modern conditions. Yet with this commitment, „sovereign“ technology promotes „dissolving forces“ which „are acting upon the political/ethical core of their nations” — their central philosophical principles. (Ricœur p.61-62) This reflects (as well) the previously noted commitment to forms of economic determinism: we must struggle and compete “globally”. Survival and competition extend well beyond military measures. Government, education, and previous humanistic/intrinsic value concerns must be reconceived (or discarded) to serve the economic system; all social areas are to be re-imagined to fit a (neoliberal) market model. One sees then a need for maintaining a balanced view – the paradox idea – yet current observable social changes do not encourage optimism. Thus the position taken here: any realistic view, however tinged with optimistic features, should reflect the basic accuracy of Ricœur’s description of this dilemma.

(to be continued)